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DEATH WATCH: THE PROCEDURAL TRAP
CAPITAL DEFENDANTS FACE IN RAISING
EXECUTION-RELATED CLAIMS
Melanie Kalmanson*
For as long as the death penalty remains a viable punishment in the
United States, safeguarding defendants’ rights from sentencing through
execution is crucial. As part of that effort, this Article focuses on a portion of
the capital appellate process that is often overlooked and, in practice,
effectively divests defendants of significant constitutional claims.
As illustrated by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bucklew v.
Precythe and Dunn v. Price, defendants face a significant procedural
predicament in raising warrant- and execution-related claims. On one hand,
courts have explained that these claims are not ripe, or are premature, when
raised before a death warrant is issued. On the other hand, as in Bucklew
and Dunn, when the defendant is under an active death warrant, courts are
skeptical of the merits of these claims and often determine the defendant
raised the claim too late, suspecting a game of delay. Since defendants are
faced with increasingly short and arbitrary warrant periods, this Article
explains, courts have essentially precluded defendants from properly raising
and being heard on these critical issues.
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Addressing this concern, this Article canvasses potential solutions,
exploring the advantages and disadvantages of each. Ultimately, this Article
concludes that the best solution is for states to enact and courts to enforce
uniform warrant procedures. In doing so, this Article proposes language that
would implement this solution. However, as states’ former attempts to enact
such procedures show, enforcement by courts is crucial for this solution to be
effective and properly safeguard defendants’ rights in last-minute, executionrelated appeals.
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INTRODUCTION
Anyone following the death penalty lately has likely wondered: why
are executions being delayed later and later? Florida’s most recent execution
was of Gary Ray Bowles on August 22, 2019.1 Bowles was pronounced dead
at 10:58 P.M.—almost five hours after the scheduled execution time.2 Just a
1

Eric Levenson, After Late Appeals Are Denied, Florida Executes Serial Killer Who
Targeted Gay Men Across Southeast, CNN (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/
2019/08/22/us/gary-bowles-execution-florida/index.html [https://perma.cc/A9H9-K7BZ].
2
Id. Similarly, Michael Lambrix (Florida) was pronounced dead at 10:10 P.M. on October
5, 2017—over four hours after the scheduled execution time. Associated Press, Florida
Executes Double Murderer Michael Lambrix, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 6, 2017),
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few months earlier, on June 20, 2019, Marion Wilson (Georgia) became the
1500th person executed in the United States since capital punishment and
executions resumed in 1976 after Furman v. Georgia3 and Gregg v. Georgia.4
Wilson was pronounced dead at 9:52 P.M.—almost three hours after the
scheduled execution time of 7 P.M.5 As of late, on-time executions seem to
be the exception, not the rule.
Even defendants who receive last-minute stays of execution are
experiencing delays at time of execution, when it ultimately occurs.
Christopher Lee Price’s Alabama execution, which was scheduled for April
11, 2019, was not stayed until after 11:34 P.M. on the night of his execution—
five hours after the scheduled execution time.6
But these delays are not a result of the state unilaterally delaying
executions. Rather, the answer lies in a procedural trap courts have created
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article177484381.html [https://perma.cc/7
TDR-WN4S]. Patrick Hannon (Florida) was pronounced dead at 8:50 P.M. on November 7,
2018—almost three hours after the scheduled execution time. Associated Press, Florida
Executes Killer Patrick Hannon After Supreme Court Rejects Last-Ditch Appeal, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-patrick-hannon-exec
ution-20171108-story.html [https://perma.cc/2V4D-LFEX].
3
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding the application of the death penalty
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment); see also Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law
Students: The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 14, 2020), https://
www.scotusblog.com/2020/02/scotus-for-law-students-the-supreme-court-and-the-death-penal
ty/ [https://perma.cc/CSC8-AA69] (tracing the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence).
4
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (allowing states to reinstitute the death penalty if
state statutes included individualized considerations to satisfy the concerns expressed in
Furman); Nicole Chavez & Rebekah Riess, Georgia Inmate is the 1,500th Person Executed in
the U.S. Since the Death Penalty Was Reinstated, CNN (June 20, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/
2019/06/20/us/marion-wilson-execution-georgia/index.html [https://perma.cc/N6V8-HSRF].
5
Id. Press Release, Ga. Dep’t of Corrs., Wilson Execution Media Advisory (June 13, 2019),
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/NewsRoom/PressReleases/wilson-execution-media-advisory
[https://perma.cc/8L44-KPXD]. Also in Georgia, Scotty Morrow was pronounced dead at
9:38 P.M. on May 2, 2019—almost three hours after the 7 P.M. scheduled execution time.
Press Release, Ga. Dep’t of Corrs., Morrow Execution Final Media Advisory (May 2, 2019),
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/NewsRoom/PressReleases/morrow-execution-final-media-advi
sory [https://perma.cc/MZ4J-HCTJ]; see also Christian Boone, Georgia Executes Scotty
Morrow for 1994 Murders of 2 Women, ATL. J. CONST. (May 2, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/
news/crime--law/georgia-set-execute-convicted-double-murderer-tonight/4r5Ibz4U8zNun6
yEKqL02M/ [https://perma.cc/9FN3-AJVV].
6
Dunn v. Price, 139 S. Ct. 1312, 1313–14 (2019); Alabama, Running Out of Time, Halts
Execution of Sword and Dagger Killer of Pastor, CBS NEWS (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/alabama-sword-dagger-killer-christopher-lee-price-execution-halted-pas
tor-bill-lynn/ [https://perma.cc/6634-C5EP]; Brendan O’Brien, Alabama Set to Execute 46Year-Old Man Convicted of Killing Minister in 1991, REUTERS (May 30, 2019), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-alabama-execution/alabama-executes-46-year-old-man-convict
ed-of-killing-minister-in-1991-idUSKCN1T018A [https://perma.cc/VBN4-E45D].
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and set for capital defendants that bottlenecks at the time of execution. In
essence, courts force defendants to raise warrant- and execution-related
claims challenging the constitutionality of their execution in last-minute
proceedings. As a result, courts are forced to review these claims in a “fire
drill approach” under increasingly short warrant periods.7 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court is faced with last-minute petitions on the night of execution,
the review of which often delays executions for several hours.8
Yet courts often deny these claims for being brought too late. The
result: courts have essentially created a procedural bar that precludes
defendants from meaningfully raising these substantive and important
constitutional claims. Courts effectively deprive defendants of the ability to
meaningfully raise and litigate warrant- and execution-related claims before
execution. In short, the process defendants and their attorneys must follow
for litigating warrant- and execution-related claims is fraught with procedural
bars, rush, and chaos.
Despite the general consensus that America will eventually abolish the
death penalty,9 the trend of states abolishing the death penalty or imposing
moratoria on executions,10 and public support for capital punishment
7

Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 493 (Fla. 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (arguing that,
these “extremely short warrant period[s] create[] a fire drill approach” to reviewing
defendant’s final claims for relief); see, e.g., Outcomes of Death Warrants in 2020, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/outcomes-of-death-warrants-in2020 [https://perma.cc/Q265-XADQ] (charting the outcomes of death warrants in 2020). See
generally James E. Coleman, Jr., Litigating at the Speed of Light: Postconviction
Proceedings Under a Death Warrant, 16 LITIG. 14 (1990) (describing the postconviction
proceedings in the case of Ted Bundy). For more information regarding the term “warrant
period,” see infra note 45 and accompanying text.
8
See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2763 (2015) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“The
studies bear out my own view, reached after considering thousands of death penalty cases
and last-minute petitions over the course of more than 20 years.”). As Justice Breyer’s dissent
in Glossip indicates, this issue has pervaded death penalty litigation for decades. See id. For
ease of discussion, the U.S. Supreme Court is referenced as the “Supreme Court.”
9
See generally CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2016) (describing the history of the Supreme Court’s
capital punishment jurisprudence); Austin Sarat et al., The Rhetoric of Abolition:
Continuity and Change in the Struggle Against America’s Death Penalty, 1900–2010, 107
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758 (2017) (documenting the evolving framing of the
arguments against capital punishment).
10
See, e.g., Colorado, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-fed
eral-info/state-by-state/colorado [https://perma.cc/Y4H6-2QP6] (last visited May 19, 2020)
(explaining Colorado abolished the death penalty in March 2020); Gretchen Frazee, How
States Are Slowly Getting Rid of the Death Penalty, PBS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.
pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-states-are-slowly-getting-rid-of-the-death-penalty [https://per
ma.cc/24V4-YY2E]; Sylvia Krohn, Numerous States Consider Repeal of the Death Penalty,
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decreasing,11 the death penalty will likely be around for a while longer. The
federal government recently announced its intent to resume executions,12 and the
Supreme Court has indicated a renewed interest in the topic.13 As long as capital
punishment remains on the books in the United States, we must ensure defendants’
constitutional rights are protected—from sentencing through execution.14
The underlying judicial processes that must occur before an inmate
reaches the execution chamber hold great significance in terms of protecting
and safeguarding capital defendants’ constitutional rights.15 Specifically,
the processes that occur after trial—collectively, the capital appellate
process—are critical in ensuring the constitutionality of capital punishment.
In fact, the Death Penalty Information Center reported in 2011 that twothirds of death sentences are overturned on appellate review.16 An important
AM. BAR ASS’N (May 10, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_
penalty_representation/project_press/2019/spring/numerous-states-consider-repeal-of-thedeath-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/RJ45-PC4X]; see also, e.g., John Gramlich, California Is One
of 11 States that Have the Death Penalty but Haven’t Used it in More than a Decade, PEW RES.
CTR. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/03/14/11-states-that-havethe-death-penalty-havent-used-it-in-more-than-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/47RD-P5L6].
11
See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2019: YEAR-END REPORT
(2019), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/reports/year-end/YearEndReport2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CS4H-VU93] (reporting that sixty percent of Americans “prefer life without parole
to the death penalty” as punishment for capital offenses).
12
Katie Benner, U.S. to Resume Capital Punishment for Federal Inmates on Death Row, N.Y.
TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/us/politics/federal-executionsdeath-penalty.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur&fbclid=IwAR1d-946v3RMbKUE41lzttdM
Nmej5YJuwhhtcByXXuqlVpMFKfvJI0-57fo [https://perma.cc/VE4Y-WP7S]; Sadie Gurman
& Jess Bravin, Federal Government Set to Resume Executions, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-government-set-to-resume-executions-11564066216?mod
=e2fb&sfns=mo [https://perma.cc/TK3H-6YSX]; see also Outcomes of Death Warrants in 2020,
supra note 7. However, since the federal government made this announcement, litigation
surrounding the announcement has transpired and remains pending, which has delayed resuming
executions. See, e.g., Mark Berman & Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Won’t Let Justice Dept.
Immediately Resume Federal Executions After Hiatus, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-wont-let-justice-dept-imm
ediately-resume-federal-executions-after-hiatus/2019/12/06/7103d8e6-1773-11ea-a659-7d6964
1c6ff7_story.html [perma.cc/NP6V-47DC]; Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Appeals Court Hands Win to
Trump Plan to Resume Federal Executions, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-deathpenalty/us-appeals-court-hands-win-to-trump-plan-to-res
ume-federal-executions-idUSKBN21P2LN [http://perma.cc/X6ZZ-BMMY].
13
See infra note 62 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bucklew v. Precythe and the
Court’s seemingly renewed interest in death penalty issues).
14
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2776 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e are left with
a judicial responsibility.”).
15
E.g., infra note 44 (reviewing scholarship on the processes).
16
See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STRUCK BY LIGHTNING: THE CONTINUING
ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY THIRTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER ITS RE-INSTATEMENT
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part of the capital appellate process is the death warrant process, which
scholarship has generally overlooked.17
Focusing on the death warrant process, this Article argues that states
should implement and enforce uniform warrant procedures that allow courts
sufficient time to thoroughly review each inmate’s warrant- and executionrelated claims. By way of background, Part II provides an overview of the
lengthy capital appellate process defendants go through before execution.18 Part
III then canvasses the difficulty capital defendants face in raising warrant- and
execution-related claims, as illustrated by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions
in Bucklew and Price. Part IV analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of
three intuitive and seemingly simple solutions to this issue. After exploring each
of these potential solutions, Part V contends that the optimal solution is likely
for state legislatures to enact and courts to enforce uniform warrant and
execution procedures, whether by statute or rule. Part V also proposes an
example of legislation that could be used to effectuate this solution.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CAPITAL APPELLATE PROCESS
After being sentenced to death, capital defendants embark on the long
capital appellate process. This Part provides a general, chronological
overview of this process, from the first appeal after sentencing to execution:
direct appeal, postconviction and federal habeas claims, executive clemency,
and final, warrant-related claims.19
1976, at 8 (2011), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/documents/StruckByLight
ning.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP8V-GNEU]; see also BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE:
HOW KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 44 (2017) (“40% of
death sentences never result in executions because cases are reversed on appeal or
postconviction for a host of reasons.”).
17
See infra note 44 (discussing existing scholarship).
18
This discussion generally assumes that the defendant has not waived the right to any
appeal. This Article also focuses on the state appellate process. Federal courts also play a
role—albeit less significant—in this process. See, e.g., Michael A. Millemann, Collateral
Remedies in Criminal Cases in Maryland: An Assessment, 64 MD. L. REV. 968, 969 (2005)
(“At the direction of Congress and the United States Supreme Court, the federal judiciary
now plays an extremely limited role in protecting the federal constitutional rights of state
prisoners.”); Wermiel, supra note 3 (“Death penalty litigation today is primarily about state
death penalty laws . . . .”). Those processes are not discussed in this Article. However, as the
federal government seeks to resume executions after a 16-year moratorium, discussing the
federal side of this issue will likely be necessary soon. Gurman & Bravin, supra note 12.
19
See, e.g., Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 656 (Ala. 1980) (“Appellate review of death cases
is required to make sure that the death penalty will not be wantonly or freakishly imposed.”
(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976))). The exact way in which these processes
proceed likely varies from state to state. This Article provides a general overview and
discusses the process generally.
IN
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First, the defendant gets a direct appeal—the appeal from the trial
court’s decision convicting the defendant of a capital offense and
imposing a sentence of death.20 In the direct appeal, defendants are limited
to challenging aspects of their trial21—for example, jury selection issues
or the trial court’s evidentiary determinations.22 In addition to errors
alleged by the defendant, some courts also review whether the evidence
was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction23 and whether the
sentence of death is proportionate.24 Courts often review these issues—
sufficiency of the evidence and proportionality—even if the defendant
does not raise a related claim.25

20

See, e.g., Death Penalty Appeals Process, CAP. PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT,
https://capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/dpappealsprocess [https://perma.cc/YPK5
-4VKP] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019) (describing the appellate process following the death
sentence). This Part provides a general overview. Because state statutes control this process,
it may differ from state to state. For another overview of this process, see, e.g., Joan M.
Fisher, Expedited Review of Capital Post-Conviction Claims: Idaho’s Flawed Process, 2 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 85, 88–90 (2000).
21
See Death Penalty Appeals Process, supra note 20.
22
See, e.g., Asay v. State, 580 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1991) (direct appeal challenging finding of
premeditation); Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1986) (direct appeal challenging the
exclusion of jurors opposed to death penalty and the admission of certain evidence); Russeau v.
State, 291 S.W.3d 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (direct appeal challenging admission of evidence).
23
In a sufficiency analysis, “the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 501 (Fla.
2011) (quoting Caraballo v. State, 39 So. 3d 1234, 1243–44 (Fla. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) (defining “sufficient
proof” as “evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the
existence of every element of the offense”).
24
The purpose of proportionality review, in which courts review “the totality of the
circumstances to determine if death is warranted in comparison to other cases where the
sentence of death has been upheld,” is to ensure the crime is among the most aggravated and
least mitigated and, therefore, deserving of death. Pham, 70 So. 3d at 500 (quoting England
v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 408 (Fla. 2006)); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984)
(explaining that proportionality review is not constitutionally required under Supreme Court
case law). Not all states conduct proportionality review. See, e.g., Brooks Emanuel, North
Carolina’s Failure to Perform Comparative Proportionality Review: Violating the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments by Allowing the Arbitrary and Discriminatory Application of
the Death Penalty, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 419, 422–31 (2015) (“North
Carolina’s imposition of the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.”). For more on proportionality, see generally William W.
Berry III, Practicing Proportionality, 64 FLA. L. REV. 687 (2012); William W. Berry III,
Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69 (2011); Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn,
Proportionality Review and the Death Penalty, 29 JUSTICE SYS. J. 257 (2008).
25
See, e.g., Pham, 70 So. 3d at 501.
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When the state’s highest court denies the direct appeal, the defendant
usually files a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.26 The Supreme
Court rarely grants petitions for writs of certiorari, much less in capital cases.27
When the Supreme Court denies the petition for writ of certiorari arising from
the direct appeal, that is the end of the litigation resulting from the original trial.28
Once the defendant’s sentence of death is final, the defendant may
raise postconviction (or “collateral”) claims as well as a state habeas corpus
petition.29 Postconviction review is available in every state.30 In this phase,
defendants raise claims “surrounding the conviction and sentence that are
outside of the record”31—for example, ineffective assistance of trial counsel
or newly discovered evidence.32 If the trial court denies the defendant’s
postconviction motion, the defendant may appeal to the state’s appellate
court.33 Likewise, if the trial court grants relief, the state may appeal. When
the appellate court denies the postconviction appeal, defendants, again,
usually file a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Outside of the first, guaranteed postconviction claim, defendants may
also and often do file successive postconviction appeals—again depending
on each state’s statutes and rules. The literature and jurists widely recognize
26

E.g., Death Penalty Appeals Process, supra note 20; Supreme Court Procedure,
SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/reference/educational-resources/supreme-court
-procedure/ [https://perma.cc/E67E-GTWX] (last visited Apr. 23, 2020). For more on
certiorari generally, see generally, e.g., Stewart A. Baker, A Practical Guide to Certiorari,
33 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 611 (1984).
27
E.g., The Supreme Court—The Statistics, 133 HARV. L. REV. 412, 427 tbl.III (2019); The
Supreme Court—The Statistics, 131 HARV. L. REV. 403, 410, 413 tbl.III (2017); see also
Success Rate of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. PRESS,
https://supremecourtpress.com/chance_of_success.html [https://perma.cc/NT2X-CPHY] (last
visited May 27, 2019) (listing the success rate of writs of certiorari by year); Wermiel, supra
note 3 (“It is extremely rare for the Supreme Court to agree to hear a direct appeal, however
. . . . That direct appeal may go all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court but will rarely be
granted.”); Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/aboutfederal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1
[https://perma.cc/9QTQ-PESC] (last visited Apr. 23, 2020) (“[T]he Court accepts 100-150 of
the more than 7,000 cases that it is asked to review each year.”); Supreme Court Procedure,
supra note 26 (“Of the 7,000 to 8,000 cert petitions filed each term, the court grants certiorari
and hears oral argument in only about 80.”).
28
Death Penalty Appeals Process, supra note 20.
29
E.g., Nancy J. King, Judicial Review: Appeals and Postconviction Proceedings, in
EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 4 (A. Redlich et
al., eds., 2014); Wermiel, supra note 3.
30
KING, supra note 29, at 4; see Death Penalty Appeals Process, supra note 20.
31
Id.
32
See generally, e.g., Lambrix v. State, 534 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1988) (initial postconviction
appeal challenging effectiveness of trial counsel).
33
See Death Penalty Appeals Process, supra note 20.
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the length of time defendants spend litigating postconviction claims, or the
delay postconviction causes in the capital process.34 In fact, some, including
the late Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, have argued that this delay
amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel
and unusual punishment.35
For example, Florida defendant Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted
in 1984 of a murder that occurred in 1983.36 Before his execution in 2017,
Lambrix had “filed numerous successive petitions for postconviction relief and
successive habeas petitions” in state court, as well as “numerous . . . pleadings
in federal court.”37 Even after the Supreme Court of Florida “determin[ed] in
2013 that Lambrix had ‘exhausted all permissible legal remedies in his case,’
Lambrix . . . continued to raise repetitive state and federal claims” all the way
through to his execution.38
34
See, e.g., Individual Justices and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/united-states-supreme-court/individualjustices [https://perma.cc/FLU7-ZXP9] (last visited Apr. 23, 2020) (documenting the
Justice’s public statements regarding the death penalty, including statements recognizing the
length of time defendants spend on death row while their cases are pending). See generally,
e.g., Nancy Levit, Expediting Death: Repressive Tolerance and Post-Conviction Due
Process Jurisprudence in Capital Cases, 59 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 55 (1990) (discussing due
process defects within the capital punishment system).
35
E.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764–72 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining
that the death penalty may violate the Eight Amendment because of “lack of reliability, the
arbitrary application of a serious and irreversible punishment, individual suffering caused by
long delays, and lack of penological purpose”); see also Christopher E. Smith, Justice John
Paul Stevens and Capital Punishment, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 205, 246 (2010) (tracing
the evolution of Justice Stevens’s death penalty jurisprudence, including his eventual belief
that a “penalty with such negligible returns to the State [is] patently excessive and cruel and
unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment” (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35,
78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (alteration in original))); David Cole, Justice Breyer v. the
Death Penalty, NEW YORKER (June 30, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/justice-breyer-against-the-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/RXQ8-GLZZ] (highlighting
Justice Breyer’s jurisprudence discussing whether the death penalty violates the Eight
Amendment); Justice John Paul Stevens’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/justice-john-paul-stevenss-death-penaltyjurisprudence [https://perma.cc/DX29-QMNW] (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (listing excerpts
from Justice Stevens’ opinions regarding the death penalty). But see, e.g., Glossip, 135 S. Ct.
at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Breyer’s point about the time defendant spend
on death row is “nonsense”).
36
See, e.g., Emily Mavrakis, Michael Lambrix Executed After 33 Years on Florida’s Death
Row, WUFT (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.wuft.org/news/2017/10/06/michael-lambrixexecuted-after-33-years-on-floridas-death-row/ [https://perma.cc/Z7XC-JGQ4].
37
Lambrix v. State, 217 So. 3d 977, 981–82 (Fla. 2017); accord Lambrix v. Jones, 227 So.
3d 550, 552 (Fla. 2017) (“Lambrix’s ‘death case . . . has been in the judicial system for a
substantial period of time.’” (quoting Lambrix v. State, 39 So. 3d 260, 262 (Fla. 2010))).
38
Lambrix, 227 So. 3d at 552 (quoting Lambrix v. State, 124 So. 3d 890, 900 (Fla. 2013)).
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Outside of the appellate process, defendants may also petition for
executive clemency.39 In this process, the governor (or a board of advisors,
or a combination of the two) has full discretion to commute a defendant’s
sentence—implementing, instead, a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole.40 Thus, the clemency process is essentially without standards or rules.
Since the death penalty was reinstituted in 1976, the frequency of executive
clemency in capital cases has declined.41
Once a defendant exhausts his or her guaranteed appeals, a death
warrant may be issued scheduling the defendant’s execution.42 In fact, some
states require the issuance of a death warrant once certain appeals have been
denied.43 While scholars often discuss capital punishment—more
specifically, capital sentencing processes and the constitutional or moral
39

See Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-re
search/clemency [https://perma.cc/3BZ8-QRNY] (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (describing the
clemency process). As with the other processes discussed in this Article, each state has its
own laws regarding executive clemency. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive
Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255, 256 (1990). Generally,
“[c]lemency decisions . . . are standardless in procedure, discretionary in exercise, and
unreviewable in result.” Id. at 257; accord Winthrop Rockefeller, Executive Clemency and
the Death Penalty, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 94, 95 (1971) (“The power to pardon is absolute.”).
40
See Bedau, supra note 39 (highlighting that clemency can result in commutation of a death
sentence “to a less severe punishment,” like a “lengthy prison term[]”); Michael L. Radelet
& Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L.
REV. 289, 289–290 (1993) (noting that the authority to pardon, grant reprieve, or commute
a sentence varies by state); Clemency, supra note 39 (discussing courts’ reluctance to impose
upon executive discretion to grant clemency); see also, e.g., Caroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883,
887–88 (Fla. 2013) (“[I]t is not this Court’s prerogative to second-guess the executive branch
on matters of clemency in capital cases”).
41
Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 40, at 290 (citing Bedau, supra note 39, at 257); see
Rockefeller, supra note 39, at 97 (“[E]xecutive clemency in the United States has been
reserved for the rare exception.”). See generally Clemency, supra note 39 (showing the low
number of clemencies granted by states since 1976).
42
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 922.052 (2020); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.141 (West
2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.160 (2020); see also Wermiel, supra note 3 (“Typically,
an inmate who is still pursuing a direct appeal or who has a first habeas petition pending in
federal court is entitled to a stay, which is a court order freezing the status quo to prevent
execution while the appeals are pending.”). Like the appellate process, the warrant process
differs from state to state.
43
See, e.g., Susanna Bagdasarova, Florida Accelerates Death Penalty Process with “Timely
Justice Act,” AM. B. ASS’N (June 1, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/commit
tees/death_penalty_representation/project_press/2013/summer/florida-accelerates-death-pen
alty-process-with-timely-justice-ac/ [https://perma.cc/J8FS-PQMW] (discussing Florida’s
Timely Justice Act of 2013). See generally OFFICE OF VICTIM’S SERVS., CAL. ATT’Y GEN.’S
OFFICE., A VICTIM’S GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL CASE PROCESS 16,
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/deathpen.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF4S
-4P68] (discussing the process of capital cases in California).
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viability of the death penalty altogether—the death warrant process has not
been addressed nearly as often or as thoroughly.44
The time between the warrant being issued and the scheduled
execution is referred to as “the warrant period.”45 Generally, once a warrant
is issued, the defendant is moved from his or her cell on death row to another
area—or, in some instances, another facility—called “death watch.”46 There,
the defendant prepares for execution.
44
For scholarship on capital sentencing process at trial, see generally, e.g., Carissa Byrne
Hessick & William W. Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst, 66 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 448 (2019) (arguing that Sixth Amendment sentencing after Hurst “invalidates several
state capital sentencing systems and several noncapital systems”); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory
Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345 (1998) (discussing whether
the addition of aggravating and mitigating factors has actually eliminated arbitrariness in
capital sentencing after Furman); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another
Decade of Legislative Expansion of the Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV.
1 (2006) (discussing how legislatures have recently expanded the death penalty by adding
aggravating factors to capital sentencing schemes). Specifically, for scholarship regarding
capital juries, see generally, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Moral Accuracy & “Wobble” in Capital
Sentencing, 80 IND. L.J. 56 (2005) (arguing that any “any system where a jury is asked to
make the moral judgment of whether someone should die” will contain inconsistency); Scott
E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse,
and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998) (analyzing the “role of remorse
and its interaction with trial strategy”); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical
Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1997)
(examining how, in capital trials, jurors “react differently to expert and non-expert testimony
and determine how they perceive so-called ‘abuse excuse’ defenses”).
For scholarship on capital postconviction processes, see generally, e.g., Fisher,
supra note 20 (focusing “on the operation of expedited capital postconviction review
procedure in Idaho”); Levit, supra note 34 (arguing for procedural due process challenges to
capital cases).
For scholarship on the viability of the death penalty altogether, see generally, e.g.,
William W. Berry III, Unusual State Capital Punishments, 72 FLA. L. REV. 315 (2020).
45
E.g., Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 493 n.23 (Fla. 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting);
Coronavirus Pandemic Halts Executions, Perhaps for the Foreseeable Future, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/coronavirus-pan
demic-halts-executions-perhaps-for-the-foreseeable-future [https://perma.cc/83NN-PBKN].
46
See, e.g., Sydney P. Freedberg, ‘Yes, I’m Angry. . . . Yes, I’m Bitter. I’m Frustrated,’ ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (July 4, 1999), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1914 [https://perm
a.cc/69VQ-X8AR] (detailing the days preceding one individual’s near execution); Adam
Tamburin, Death Row Inmate Billy Ray Irick Moved to Death Watch Ahead of Thursday
Execution Date, TENNESSEAN (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/
crime/2018/08/07/tennessee-death-row-billy-ray-irick-moved-death-watch-before-executiondate/923464002/ [https://perma.cc/4AKF-VULW] (“Death watch is the three-day period
before an execution when strict guidelines are implemented to maintain the security and control
of the offender and to maintain safe and orderly operations of the prison . . . .”); see also Death
Row, FLA. DEP’T OF CORRS., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/deathrow.html [https://perma.cc/ 274LSHA3] (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (providing an overview of death row in Florida prisons).
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After a warrant issues, most defendants file a final claim raising
warrant- or execution-related claims, which ultimately leads to a final appeal.
While some defendants may raise these claims before a death warrant is
issued,47 courts generally consider these claims premature and, as explained
below, deny the claims when brought before a warrant. Claims defendants
raise after a warrant is issued (referenced collectively herein as “warrant- or
execution-related claims”) include—but are not limited to—arguments that
(a) the warrant process is arbitrary and, therefore, violates the Eighth
Amendment; (b) the execution will violate the Eighth Amendment due to the
time the defendant has spent on death row; (c) the method of execution
violates the Eighth Amendment because it causes a substantial risk of pain
and, therefore, amounts to cruel and unusual punishment; and (d) the
defendant is otherwise ineligible for execution under the Eighth
Amendment—due to intellectual disability or for some other reason.48
Oftentimes, courts are rushed to review these warrant- or executionrelated claims because defendants face short warrant periods,49 which force
them to raise, litigate, obtain a ruling on, and exhaust appeals on these claims
within a matter of weeks—sometimes days.50 As one author explained,
47

See infra Part III (discussing procedural setbacks defendants may face in their death
penalty claims, including issues with ripeness).
48
See, e.g., Long v. State, 271 So. 3d 938, 941 (Fla. 2019) (court denying defendant’s many
constitutional claims, including that the death penalty violated his rights due to the length of
time he had spent on death row, his mental illness, and the lethal injection method); Asay v.
State, 224 So. 3d 695, 702–03 (Fla. 2017) (defendant challenging the lethal injection method
and the death penalty, generally, by alleging that the court’s prior actions were arbitrary and
violated his due process rights); Lambrix v. State, 227 So. 3d 550, 552 (Fla. 2017) (court
denying defendant’s evidentiary and procedural claims for relief). In addition, defendants
may raise claims of innocence or other guilt-related claims.
49
For example, in Florida, recent executions followed warrant periods of around thirty days.
See Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 493 (Fla. 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (“Since
executions resumed in Florida [in 2017], the judicial system—the circuit courts, this Court,
and the United States Supreme Court—has been faced with increasingly short warrant
periods, the shortest being the one in this case—a mere 27 days.”). Recent warrant periods
in Alabama have been just as short. See, e.g., Ivana Hrynkiw, Execution Date Set for Man
Convicted in 1997 Pelham Quadruple Slaying, AL.COM, https://www.al.com/news/bir
mingham/2019/04/execution-date-set-for-man-convicted-in-1997-pelham-quadruple-slaying.
html [https://perma.cc/2E37-DYBA] (last updated May 14, 2019) (detailing an Alabama
death row inmate’s short warrant period of only a few weeks); see also Melanie Kalmanson,
Steps Toward Abolishing Capital Punishment: Incrementalism in the American Death
Penalty, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 587, 630-34 (2020) (discussing the effect of delay in
the warrant and execution process).
50
See, e.g., Dunn v. Price, 139 S. Ct. 1312, 1315 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is
possible that Price was given no more than 72 hours to decide how he wanted to die,
notwithstanding the 30-day period prescribed by state law.”); Levit, supra note 34, at 83
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Collapsing the time for adjudication of capital habeas cases
has a powerful substantive impact. Death row inmates, who
have no right to counsel, who are generally uneducated, and
who must psychologically prepare to die, are forced to
comprehend several supremely complex areas of law, all
within an accelerated time frame.51
As this Article explains, this concern is exacerbated with respect to warrantand execution-related claims.
As with the other appeals discussed above, after the state court denies
warrant- and execution-related claims, defendants generally file petitions for
writs of certiorari and/or applications for a stay of execution with the
Supreme Court.52 The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari or stay of
execution at this point is generally the final step before the defendant
proceeds to execution. The rush of short warrant periods often causes the
Supreme Court to review last-minute petitions for writ of certiorari.53 The
last-minuteness often causes the Supreme Court to delay execution while it
reviews the last-minute requests for relief.54
Despite the extent of the capital appellate process, a gaping hole exists
somewhere between death row and death watch. In that hole is the time at
which defendants may properly raise warrant- and execution-related claims
and have a fair opportunity to fully litigate those claims.
II. GAPING HOLE IN THE CAPITAL APPELLATE PROCESS, AS ILLUSTRATED
BY U.S. SUPREME COURT’S RECENT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia in
1972 and then Gregg v. Georgia in 1976 instituted contemporary capital
punishment.55 Since then, most of the Supreme Court’s decisions instituting
(“[C]apital habeas litigants may be required, on extremely short notice, to argue . . . that a
pending execution should be stayed and to fully litigate the range of substantive legal issues
and habeas procedures on the merits.”); Executions Scheduled for 2020, supra note 7.
51
Levit, supra note 34, at 56.
52
For more explanation on the process the Supreme Court uses in reviewing these requests,
see, e.g., Wermiel, supra note 3.
53
See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2763 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The studies
[highlighting the arbitrary application of the death penalty] bear out my own view, reached
after considering thousands of death penalty cases and last-minute petitions over the course
of more than 20 years.”); Wermiel, supra note 3 (“Today, a stay application may still come
in at night and close to the time of execution.”).
54
See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Kalmanson, supra note 49, at 630–34
(discussing delays in the warrant and execution process).
55
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see
Wermiel, supra note 3 (explaining the background information).

14

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[June 2020

changes to capital punishment—other than decisions holding certain classes
of defendants ineligible for execution under the Eighth Amendment56—have
addressed the judicial processes that must occur between the crime and
execution.57 The Supreme Court has issued prophylactic decisions clarifying
how constitutional principles apply to certain aspects of the capital
punishment process58 but has avoided squarely confronting the
constitutionality of capital punishment,59 despite some Justices urging the
Court to do so.60
Justice Kennedy’s 2018 retirement undoubtedly ushered in a new era
for the Court—in more contexts than just capital punishment.61 Although the
56
See generally, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that juvenile
defendants are not eligible for capital punishment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(holding that intellectually disabled defendants are not eligible for capital punishment); Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that insane defendants are not eligible for
capital punishment). For more on how the pool of eligibility has been narrowed and how this
may continue in the future, see generally Kalmanson, supra note 49.
57
E.g., McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 709 (2020) (holding that “state appellate courts
may . . . [independently] reweigh[] aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and may do
so in collateral proceedings as appropriate and provided under state law”); see also, e.g.,
Adam M. Gershowitz, Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, 72 MO. L. REV. 73, 73 (2007)
(“[T]he Supreme Court . . . has laid down dozens of procedural rules for the death penalty
over the last thirty years.”); id. at 76 (“[T]oday’s death-penalty trials are marked by
considerably more rules and procedural hurdles than three decades ago.”(emphasis
removed)); Renee Knake, Abolishing Death, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 (2018)
(explaining the procedure-based issues the Court generally hears in death penalty cases). See
generally STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 9 (addressing the Supreme Court’s constitutional
regulation of the death penalty).
58
See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019) (“We simply enforce and
reinforce Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.”).
59
See, e.g., Knake, supra note 57, at 10 (“[A] majority of the Supreme Court appears unlikely
to conclude that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.”);
James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment,
1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 119 (2007) (discussing the need for the Supreme Court
to further regulate capital punishment); see also Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating
Factors, supra note 44, at 350–51 (explaining how, before Furman, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of capital punishment). See generally James E. Coleman, One Way or
Another the Death Penalty Will Be Abolished, but Only After the Public No Longer Has
Confidence in Its Use, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 15–16 (2018) (arguing that a
prerequisite for any successful abolitionist movement must be the erosion of public
confidence in the death penalty).
60
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764–72 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Ginsburg, J., joining).
61
See, e.g., Brendan Beery, Rational Basis Loses its Bite: Justice Kennedy’s Retirement
Removes the Most Lethal Quill from LGBT Advocates’ Equal Protection Quiver, 69 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 69, 71 (2019) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s influence on LGBT rights); Zachary S.
Price, Symmetric Constitutionalism: An Essay on Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Post-Kennedy
Supreme Court, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1314 (2019) (discussing the fate of substantive due
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full effect of Justice Kennedy’s departure remains unclear, the “new” Court
has already proven more outspoken on capital punishment than the “old”
Court. The new Court seems to have a renewed interest in the death penalty,
as demonstrated most clearly by the Court’s recent decision in Bucklew v.
Precythe.62 The Court’s decision in Bucklew will undoubtedly spur discussion
about the principles surrounding capital sentencing and what the future may
hold for capital punishment under the new Court. Contributing to that
discussion, this Article explains how Bucklew and another recent Supreme
Court decision, Dunn v. Price,63 illustrate a widespread and longstanding
problem defendants face in raising warrant- and execution-related claims.64
Oftentimes, courts deny capital defendants’ warrant- and
execution-related claims as unripe when raised before the defendant is
under an active death warrant.65 In doing so, courts reason that these
process under the post-Kennedy Court); Impact of Justice Kennedy’s Retirement Examined,
HARV. GAZETTE (June 28, 2018), https://news.harvard.edu/ gazette/story/2018/06/the-impactof-justice-kennedys-retirement-is-examined/ [https://perma.cc/ QVG2-ED6Z] (explaining
the impact of Justice Kennedy’s retirement on the future of the Court); Stewart M. Patrick,
The Global Implications of Justice Kennedy’s Retirement, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June
28,
2018),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/global-implications-justice-kennedys-retirement
[https://perma.cc/G4P5-86CS] (discussing the effect Kennedy’s retirement will likely have on
international law). Some argue that Trump’s presidency coinciding with Kennedy’s retirement
further contributes to this change. See generally J. Richard Broughton, The Federal Death
Penalty, Trumpism, and Civil Rights Enforcement, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1611 (2018) (observing
“the underappreciated place of the federal death penalty in American law and politics”).
62
Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019); see, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, A
Supreme Court Do-Over, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
04/11/opinion/supreme-court-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/X874-YRP8] (discussing
the Supreme Court’s “glaringly disparate treatment of two death-row inmates”); Lawrence
Hurley, Death Penalty Tensions Flare Again on Divided U.S. Supreme Court, REUTERS
(May 13, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-deathpenalty/death-penaltytensions-flare-again-on-divided-u-s-supreme-court-idUSKCN1SJ1RI [https://perma.cc/AP
L6-SJFG] (noting “internal divisions” between Supreme Court Justices on the issue of capital
punishment); Adam Liptak, Rancor and Raw Emotion Surface in Supreme Court Death
Penalty Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/us/
politics/supreme-court-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/PS3Z -XY4L] (noting the close
5–4 decision in a capital punishment case).
63
Dunn v. Price, 139 S. Ct. 1312 (2019).
64
Some scholars have discussed this issue in the past. See generally Fisher, supra note 20
(discussing procedural delays between conviction and execution); Levit, supra note 34
(discussing due process concerns in capital cases).
65
See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904, 918 (Fla. 2013) (“We have repeatedly held that
this claim may not be asserted until a death warrant has been issued.” (citing Johnson v.
State, 104 So. 3d 1010, 1029 (Fla. 2012))); Butler v. State, 100 So. 3d 638, 672 (Fla. 2012)
(“As this Court has explained, ‘a claim of incompetency to be executed cannot be asserted
until a death warrant has been issued.’ ” (citing Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1115–16

16

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[June 2020

claims are not ripe until the inmate has an active death warrant.66 But,
when the inmate is under an active death warrant and raises these claims,
courts oftentimes deny the claims for being raised too late67—as Bucklew
and Price illustrate. In fact, as Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion in
Bucklew illustrates, some courts accuse defendants of raising these claims
merely as an attempt to delay execution.68 Indeed, the media perpetuates
this narrative.69
This Part uses the Court’s decisions in Bucklew and Price to illustrate
how the system’s gaping procedural hole effectively deprives defendants of an
opportunity to meaningfully raise warrant- and execution-related claims. While
illustrative of this problem, Bucklew and Price’s cases are not anomalies. Rather,
this issue pervades the capital appellate process across the country, causing lastminute delays in the hours before execution. The idea that defendants engage in
last-minute gamesmanship to delay executions is prevalent in decades of
precedent from both the Supreme Court and state courts.70 In fact, the Supreme
Court has explicitly allowed courts to “consider the last-minute nature of an
application to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief.”71

(Fla. 2008))); Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 521–22 (Fla. 2008) (holding that defendant’s
claim that he was insane and, therefore, ineligible for execution was not ripe for review
because “a death warrant ha[d] not yet been signed”); Phillips v. State, 894 So. 2d 28, 36
(Fla. 2004) (“However, this claim cannot be raised until an execution is imminent.”); Jones
v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003) (“[C]laim is not ripe for review because Jones has not
yet been found incompetent and a death warrant has not yet been signed.”); State v.
Washington, 330 P.3d 596, 626 (Or. 2014) (“We agree with the state that the specific method
of defendant’s execution—as opposed to the death sentence itself—is not ripe for
consideration by this court, nor will it be until all direct and collateral review proceedings
have concluded and a death warrant has issued.”). Contra, e.g., Gregory v. Pa. State Police,
160 A.3d 274, 277 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (finding that “[w]ith regard to ripeness, the issues
here are fully developed” despite the defendant having no active death warrant because “the
harm is not speculative” and eventually “will be imposed by operation of law”).
66
E.g., supra note 65.
67
See Adam Liptak, Over 3 A.M. Dissent, Supreme Court Says Alabama Execution May
Proceed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/us/politics/
supreme-court-alabama-execution-.html [https://perma.cc/K3XU-3BK8] (describing the
Supreme Court’s majority opinion permitting the execution of Christopher L. Price); see
also, e.g., Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004) (rejecting defendant’s claim
because it was raised at the last minute).
68
See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1134 (2019) (implying that defendant used
claim as a tactic to forestall execution).
69
See, e.g., Gurman & Bravin, supra note 12 (providing an example of the media’s
participation in this “delay” narrative).
70
See, e.g., Nelson, 541 U.S. at 649 (quoting Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 503
U.S. 653, 654 (1992)) (noting that defendants employ legal tactics to delay capital punishment).
71
Id. (quoting Gomez, 503 U.S. at 654).
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A. Supreme Court’s Decision in Bucklew v. Precythe
In 2014, Russell Bucklew raised an as-applied Eighth Amendment
challenge to the State of Missouri’s lethal injection protocol, alleging it would
cause him substantial pain due to an “unusual medical condition” that would
result in significant complications during execution.72 After extensive
litigation about appropriate alternatives to lethal injection for Bucklew’s
execution, in 2018, the Supreme Court—before Justice Kennedy’s
retirement—granted a second stay of execution on the day Bucklew was
scheduled to be executed.73
Then, on April 1, 2019, after Justice Kennedy’s retirement, the new
Court issued its decision in Bucklew. Despite the long history of litigation on
Bucklew’s claim, the majority opinion continuously accused Bucklew of
raising the claim as a delay tactic. In the first paragraph of the majority
opinion, Justice Gorsuch wrote: “Mr. Bucklew raised this claim for the first
time less than two weeks before his scheduled execution.”74 Then,
concluding Bucklew was not entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment,
Justice Gorsuch again questioned whether Bucklew’s motive for filing the
claim was merely gamesmanship to delay execution.75 Justice Gorsuch
suggested Bucklew may have been more interested in delaying his
execution than avoiding unnecessary pain due to his inability to identify an
available alternative to the lethal injection protocol he challenged.76 At the
end of the majority opinion, Gorsuch even stated that Bucklew was
successful in “secur[ing] delay through lawsuit after lawsuit,”77 and opined
that “[t]he people of Missouri, the surviving victims of Mr. Bucklew’s
crimes, and others like them deserve better.”78 The word “delay” appears in
the Court’s majority opinion six times.79
Consistent with how state courts often treat last-minute warrantand execution-related claims, the majority seemed to use the delay theory
as a reason for denying Bucklew’s claim. For example, the majority
commented that it is not for the courts to “reward those who interpose
delay with a decree ending capital punishment by judicial fiat.”80 Rather,
“[t]he proper role of courts is to ensure that method-of-execution
72

Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1118.
Id. at 1122.
74
Id. at 1118.
75
Id. at 1128–29.
76
Id. at 1129.
77
Id. at 1133–34 (emphasis added).
78
Id. at 1134.
79
Id. at 1128–34.
80
Id.
73
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challenges to lawfully issued sentences are resolved fairly and
expeditiously. Courts should police carefully against attempts to use such
challenges as tools to interpose unjustified delay.”81
In their separate dissenting opinions, both Justice Breyer—joined
by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan82—and Justice Sotomayor responded to
the majority’s theme of delay. While acknowledging the state’s and
victims’ interests in expediting executions, Justice Breyer explained that
delays pervade the capital process, from the time defendants spend waiting
on death row for execution—a topic on which Justice Breyer has written
extensively83—to the execution process itself.84 Related to the issue
discussed here, Justice Breyer explained that, contrary to the majority’s
suggestion, these delays actually affect defendants’ substantive rights, as
opposed to merely causing an inconvenience to the courts.85
Rather, Justice Breyer noted, the majority has created
“unwarranted obstacles in the path of prisoners” seeking relief from
unconstitutional executions.86 Justice Breyer also distinguished between
the delay caused by the appellate process, over which defendants have no
control, and the delay caused by what the majority characterizes as
defendants raising frivolous claims just before execution, commenting
that the “majority’s new rules are not even likely to improve the problems
of delay at which they are directed.”87 Similarly, Justice Sotomayor
clarified that the issue of delay was not before the Court and emphasized
that delay should not be a reason to foreclose otherwise meritorious
constitutional claims.88 Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority’s
discussion on delay should not be read to endorse a standard under which
courts “treat[] late-arising claims as presumptively suspect.”89
As Justices Breyer and Sotomayor explain, the majority’s decision
in Bucklew unnecessarily condoned lower courts denying defendants’
warrant- and execution-related claims for being brought too close to
execution. Yet, the majority failed to address the fact that oftentimes
defendants have no choice but to raise these claims close to execution due
81

Id.
Justice Sotomayor also joined the dissent, but not as to the discussion on delay. Id. at 1146
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
83
See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764–72 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(discussing the cruelty of excessive delay in death penalty cases); id. at 2748 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (responding to Justice Breyer’s discussion on delay).
84
Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1144–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1445.
88
Id. at 1146 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
89
Id. at 1147.
82
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to short warrant periods and precedent directing that these claims are ripe
only after a warrant has been issued.90
B. Eleven Days After Bucklew: Supreme Court Issues 3 A.M. Decision in
Dunn v. Price
Eleven days after the Court decided Bucklew, Alabama was
scheduled to execute Christopher Lee Price at 6:00 P.M.91 Price had
requested that he be executed using nitrogen hypoxia instead of lethal
injection so he would not endure “severe pain and needless suffering”
during his execution.92 When the State denied his request, Price brought an
Eighth Amendment claim similar to Bucklew’s.93
Determining Price was “likely to prevail on the issue of whether
execution by nitrogen . . . would provide a significant reduction in the
substantial risk of severe pain Price would incur if he were executed by
lethal injection,” the U.S. District Court granted a stay of execution.94 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit “refused to vacate the
District Court’s stay.”95
Around 9:00 P.M. the night of Price’s scheduled execution, the State
of Alabama filed an application to the Supreme Court to lift the stay of
execution, which was “referred to the Conference.”96 When the application
was still pending at 11:34 P.M., the state called off the execution because
the death warrant expired at midnight and there was no longer enough time
before the warrant expired to complete the execution.97 It would be a few
more hours before the Supreme Court issued its decision.98
Finally, around 3:00 A.M. the morning after Christopher Price’s
execution was scheduled, the Supreme Court issued a one-paragraph
90
See supra note 65 (illustrating circumstances in which defendants were unable to raise
Eighth Amendment claims until shortly prior to their execution dates).
91
Price v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2019); Price v. Dunn,
385 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1222 (S.D. Ala. 2019).
92
Dunn v. Price, 139 S. Ct. 1312, 1313 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93
Price v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d at 1321.
94
Price, 139 S. Ct. at 1313–14 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Price v. Dunn, 385 F. Supp.
3d at 1233).
95
Id. at 1314.
96
Id.
97
Brendan O’Brien & Alex Dobuzinskis, U.S. Supreme Court Will Allow Execution,
Alabama Still Delayed as Death Warrant Expired at Midnight, REUTERS (April 11, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alabama-execution/u-s-supreme-court-will-allow-execu
tion-alabama-still-delayed-as-death-warrant-expired-at-midnight-idUSKCN1RN14E [https://
perma.cc/9D4E-5F2Q]; Alabama, Running Out of Time, Halts Execution of Sword and
Dagger Killer of Pastor, supra note 6.
98
O’Brien & Dobuzinskis, supra note 97.
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decision granting the State of Alabama’s application to vacate the stay of
execution.99 Again, the majority suggested that Price’s claim was merely a
delay tactic.100
Once more, Justice Breyer dissented—joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. He explained that the Court had denied his
“request[] that the Court take no action” until the next morning, “when the
matter could be discussed at Conference.”101 Although he “recognized that
[his] request would delay resolution of the application and that the State
would have to obtain a new execution warrant, thus delaying the execution
by 30 days,” Justice Breyer felt the “delay was warranted.”102
Explaining the irony in the Court’s suggestion that Price’s claim
only served to delay execution, Justice Breyer wrote: “The Court suggests
that the reason is delay. But that suggestion is untenable in light of the
District Court’s express finding that Price has been ‘proceeding as quickly
as possible on this issue since before the execution date was set.’”103
As a result of the Court’s decision, Price’s execution was
rescheduled for May 30, 2019.104 Again, Price filed an application for stay
of execution to the Supreme Court. Over an hour after the rescheduled
execution, in another 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court denied Price’s
application for stay.105 Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion (joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) revealed that the district court
had scheduled a trial on Price’s claims for June 10.106
As the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bucklew and Price illustrate,
defendants are caught between the proverbial rock and hard place when it
comes to raising warrant- and execution-related claims. The rock: Courts
deny defendants’ warrant- and execution-related claims as premature when
raised before the defendant is under an active warrant. The hard place: Once
a warrant is issued—generally with an extremely short warrant period—

99

Price, 139 S. Ct. at 1312; Liptak, supra note 67.
Price, 139 S. Ct. at 1312.
101
Id. at 1314 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102
Id.
103
Id. (citation omitted).
104
Outcomes of Death Warrants in 2019, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.
org/stories/outcomes-of-death-warrants-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/73ZB-FXKY] (last updated
Dec. 11, 2019).
105
Alabama Executes Man Convicted of Killing Pastor with Sword and Knife Just Before
Christmas, CBS NEWS (May 31, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/christopher-leeprice-execution-alabama-executes-man-for-killing-pastor-with-sword-and-knife-just-before
-christmas/ [https://perma.cc/GR86-A2B8].
106
Id.
100
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courts deny warrant- and execution-related claims as being brought too late,
or merely as a tactic to delay execution.107
III. SEEMINGLY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS
Two seemingly simple solutions to this procedural difficulty arise:
(A) allow defendants to raise execution-related claims sooner, or (B) disallow
courts from using delay as a reason for denying warrant- or execution-related
claims. While these potential solutions may seem intuitive, courts have not
adopted either. This Part canvasses the advantages and disadvantages of each
of these solutions and explains why courts may have steered away from them.
A. Allow Defendants to Raise Execution-Related Claims Sooner
When thinking of this issue, the first logical solution seems to be to
allow defendants to raise execution- and warrant-related claims sooner. The
rationale: Death row defendants are, by definition, subject to execution. Thus,
we should allow them to raise warrant- and execution-related claims so long
as they are under a sentence of death.
The advantages of this approach include allowing defendants the
opportunity to fully litigate their claims and the courts to fully review these
claims without the time-pressure that often accompanies active warrants. In
addition to allowing for more thorough investigation of these claims—for
example, into new execution protocols—this solution seems to provide a sounder
resolution of defendants’ claims, at least from a due process perspective.108
However, adopting this logic would require courts to abandon the
longstanding theory that warrant- and execution-related claims are not ripe
until the defendant is under an active warrant that provides a scheduled date
and time for the defendant’s execution. Also, this approach could overwhelm
courts with speculative claims. For instance, if a defendant challenges the
state’s execution protocol as it stands in June 2019, the defendant assumes
that protocol is the one that will exist (and be used) when the defendant is
ultimately executed. Rather, the state could amend the protocol before the
defendant’s execution, rendering any decision regarding the June 2019
execution an exercise in futility—at least as applied to that specific defendant.
107

See also Levit, supra note 34, at 85–86 (explaining how courts play into the opportunity
to truncate postconviction review).
108
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 538 (1985) (discussing the due process requirement of a “hearing at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))).
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Further, this approach may not completely resolve the chilling effect
on some warrant- and execution-related claims. For example, suppose a rule
was implemented requiring defendants to raise warrant- and executionrelated claims in their first successive postconviction motions—the only
guaranteed postconviction motion (and, therefore, appeal). What if a
defendant does so, the appeal is denied, but the state proceeds to amend its
execution protocol after that appeal is denied? Like the dilemma defendants
currently face, as described above, the defendant would remain hard-pressed
to find the appropriate opportunity for challenging the amended protocol
since the first postconviction motion would have already been exhausted.
Courts would likely say the defendant raised the claim too late—after the
designated appeal. For these reasons, this approach is likely not the best
solution to the procedural trap facing capital defendants in raising warrantand execution-related claims.
B. Disallow Courts from Using Delay as a Reason for Denying ExecutionRelated Claims
The other seemingly obvious solution would be to disavow delay as
a reason for denying warrant- or execution-related claims. Disallowing courts
from denying warrant- or execution-related claims based on alleged delay in
raising the claims would force courts to review the merits of these oftentimes
significant claims.
However, this solution could result in unintended consequences that
ultimately render this solution more detrimental to defendants than the
problem it aims to resolve. For example, courts may be inclined to deny
otherwise meritorious claims to avoid a stay of execution. Or, this solution
could frustrate judges by causing the perception of too many unnecessary
stays of execution, forced by the requirement that courts, faced with short
warrant periods, review the merits of each claim.
Further, this solution would likely prove difficult to implement. A
legislative mechanism would likely raise separation of powers issues because
the legislative branch cannot tell the courts how to review, much less to rule
on, cases or controversies.109 Likewise, a judicial mechanism, such as a
Supreme Court determination that delay is an invalid reason for denying these
claims, would be unlikely to rectify the issue. Even after such a
109

See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1950–51 (2015)
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (warning of the danger of congressional violations of Article III
judicial powers); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (describing the separation
of powers into three distinct branches in the United States constitutional scheme); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–04 (1974) (affirming that, despite “the deference each branch
must accord the others,” the branches of government still retain separation of powers).
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determination, the Supreme Court, in its final review of petitions for a writ
certiorari or applications for a stay of execution, could still deny the claims
and allow executions to proceed, as in Price’s case. Likewise, unless
implemented by the Supreme Court, the state courts would likely determine
their own iterations of the appropriate standard, causing a great lack of
uniformity and, in turn, creating separate Eighth Amendment concerns.110 For
these reasons, this is likely not the ideal solution to the procedural trap facing
capital defendants in raising warrant- and execution-related claims.
IV. ENACT AND ENFORCE UNIFORM WARRANT AND
EXECUTION-RELATED PROCEDURES
Having established that the seemingly obvious solutions are likely
not ideal, this Part outlines a third, not-so-clear solution that, this Part
contends, is the best route to balancing all of the competing interests and
providing uniformity and stability to the capital appellate process with
respect to warrant- and execution-related claims. Specifically, this Part
contends the solution lies in enacting and enforcing uniform warrant
procedures, whether by statute or rule. At the outset, Section A explains
how some states have attempted to implement these types of procedures.
Then, using those examples to guide the rest of the discussion, this Part
presents a two-step solution in which states enact and enforce uniform
warrant- and execution-related procedures.
Section B explains the first step in implementing this solution: the
enactment of such warrant procedures—either by way of the legislature
enacting a statute, or courts enacting a procedural rule.111 This Section
defines the multiple aspects that a statute or rule should include and then
provides proposed language. Once the necessary statutes or rues exist, the
second step, which is discussed in Section C, would be for courts to be
diligent in holding the other branches accountable by enforcing the
statutes or rules. After explaining this two-step path to implementing this
solution, Section D addresses potential counterarguments to this solution.
Ultimately, this Part concludes that this solution is likely the best way to
balance all of the competing interests involved here—judicial efficiency,
defendants’ rights, etc.

110

See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (detailing the different standards
states have applied with regard to the Eight Amendment).
111
Which of these would be appropriate would depend on each state’s governing law
regarding the court’s jurisdiction to control procedure.

24

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[June 2020

A. Prior Attempts to Institute Uniform Warrant Procedures
In response to the length of time the capital appellate process often
takes—causing delays between sentencing and execution—some states have
adopted procedures for expediting the post-trial process.112 Many of these
state statutes are modeled after the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act
(UPCPA), which “replaces all common law remedies, and provides one
procedure for asserting every constitutional, jurisdictional, or other ground
for collateral relief that has not been previously litigated or waived.”113 The
UPCPA allows claims “to be brought at any time during imprisonment,”
with certain limitations.114
For example, since 1984, Idaho has used “an expedited and
consolidated appeal process,”115 the purpose of which was to “eliminat[e]
unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence.”116 The Idaho
statute requires defendants to “file any legal or factual challenge” to their
sentence of death within forty-two days of judgment.117 Otherwise, the claim
is waived.118 In other words, defendants have only “one opportunity to raise
all challenges to the[ir] conviction and sentence.”119 After the forty-two days
passed or the one appeal was denied, a death warrant should be issued.120
However, as a 2000 article explained, courts failed to consistently or
regularly impose these restrictions.121
More drastic than Idaho, in 1989, the Arkansas Supreme Court
“abolished its postconviction remedy altogether.”122 The court said it was
concerned that postconviction was unnecessarily drawn out before cases were

112

Fisher, supra note 20, at 87 (describing Idaho’s unitary system of reviewing appeals in
capital cases). For other examples not discussed here, see generally John H. Blume, An
Introduction to Post-Conviction Remedies, Practice and Procedure in South Carolina, 45
S.C. L. REV. 235 (1994) (reviewing South Carolina’s postconviction review process);
Millemann, supra note 18 (reviewing Maryland’s postconviction review process); Jeffrey T.
Renz, Post-Conviction Relief in Montana, 55 MONT. L. REV. 331 (1994) (reviewing
Montana’s postconviction review process); Note, State Post-Conviction Remedies, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 681 (1961) (discussing several states’ approaches to postconviction review).
113
State Post-Conviction Remedies, supra note 112, at 698.
114
Id.
115
Fisher, supra note 20, at 87.
116
Id. at 91 (citation omitted).
117
IDAHO CODE § 19-2719(3) (2020); see Fisher, supra note 20, at 91.
118
IDAHO CODE § 19-2719(5); see Fisher, supra note 20, at 91.
119
Id. (quoting Paz v. State, 852 P.2d 1355, 1356 (Idaho 1993)).
120
Id. at 102; see IDAHO CODE § 19-2719.
121
Fisher, supra note 20, at 91.
122
Id. at 108.
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concluded.123 However, a year later, the court “reestablished [the]
postconviction process.”124
In 2000, Florida Governor Jeb Bush called for the state “to adopt a
‘unitary review’ system of appeal in capital cases, which is designed to
shorten the time between conviction and execution of sentences.”125 Thirteen
years later, the Florida legislature enacted the “Timely Justice Act of 2013”
(“the Act”).126 The purpose of the Act was to “ensure that cases are processed
in a timely manner.”127 Under the Act, the Governor of Florida is required to
issue a warrant for execution within thirty days of the conclusion of the
defendant’s guaranteed appeals, provided “the executive clemency process
has concluded,”128 and the warrant should schedule the execution within 180
days.129 However, similar to Idaho, Florida courts have not enforced the Act,
and the warrant process in Florida remains a matter of complete executive
discretion.130 In exercising this discretion, Florida’s governors have not upheld
the statutory time periods. Most significantly, rather than heeding the 180-day
warrant period provided for in the Act, Florida’s governors have recently
123

Id. at 109–10.
Id. at 109.
125
Id. at 85. A “unitary review” system “essentially consolidates the direct appeal and state
postconviction process to eliminate the additional time involved in” considering
postconviction claims. Id. at 85–86.
126
FLA. STAT. § 922.052 (2018).
127
Bagdasarova, supra note 43; see Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529, 537 (Fla. 2014)
(discussing the Act’s purpose to resolve capital cases as quickly as possible after the
imposition of a death sentence).
128
FLA. STAT. § 922.052(2)(b) (2018); accord Abdool, 141 So. 3d at 543 (upholding this
provision of the Act because it does not “unconstitutionally infringe[] on the Governor’s . . .
unfettered discretion to issue warrants by mandating that the Governor must sign a warrant
once the Clerk issues a certification”).
129
FLA. STAT. § 922.052(2)(b); see Abdool, 141 So. 3d at 543–44 (finding the 180-day
requirement reasonable).
130
In Abdool, the Supreme Court of Florida denied a constitutional challenge to the Timely
Justice Act of 2013. 141 So. 3d at 538–47. In doing so, the court stated: “The State has a
legitimate interest in ensuring that capital sentences are carried out in a timely manner.” Id.
at 546. Florida defendants continue to unsuccessfully challenge this discretionary process.
See, e.g., Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 509 (Fla. 2017) (“We have repeatedly and
consistently denied these claims.” (citing Bolin v. State, 184 So. 3d 492, 502–03 (Fla. 2015));
Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1162–63 (Fla. 2013) (“Because Mann has not presented any
reason for this Court to recede from its prior decisions, Mann’s claim is without merit and
was properly denied.”); Ferguson v. State, 101 So. 3d 362, 366 (Fla. 2012) (“Because we
have previously rejected similar claims, we find that the circuit court properly denied
Ferguson’s present claim.”); Gore v. State, 91 So. 3d 769, 780 (Fla. 2012) (“As recently as last
year, we rejected claims that because of the Governor’s absolute discretion to sign death
warrants, and thereby decide who lives and who dies, the death penalty structure of Florida
violates the United States Constitution.”); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 551–52 (Fla. 2011)
(declining to “‘second guess’ the application of the exclusive executive function of clemency”).
124
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provided warrant periods of merely thirty days, give or take.131 And, Florida is
not alone in the phenomena of short warrant periods; just recently, Georgia
issued a warrant that provided a warrant period of a scant twelve days.132
These former attempts by states to streamline the postconviction
process focused on the goals of efficiency and reducing delay in the warrant
litigation process. But they were insufficient in recognizing the vulnerability
of defendants’ rights during the process they addressed.133
An Oregon statute seems to attempt to address defendants’ ability to
raise additional claims when execution is pending. The statute provides for
an automatic stay of ninety days if certain events trigger the stay and a thirtyday stay after the Supreme Court denies a petition for certiorari to provide
the defendant an opportunity to notice the lower court of a forthcoming claim
for postconviction relief.134 The statute also directs that an execution is stayed
while a defendant’s claim for postconviction relief is pending.135 Certainly,
the ninety-day stay provided in the Oregon statute is better than the thirtyday warrant periods recently provided in Florida, for example.
Drawing on these examples, the next Section discusses the first step
in the two-step solution presented herein.
B. States to Enact Uniform Warrant and Execution-Related Procedures
First, in the interest of uniformity and transparency in the warrant and
execution process, states should enact uniform warrant procedures that both
the executive and judicial branches must follow (“the procedures”). The
procedures should explain when the defendant is eligible for execution—i.e.,
what appeals must be concluded. The procedures should also outline when,
after the point the defendant becomes eligible for execution, an inmate’s
warrant should be issued. As to the warrant, the procedures should enumerate
what must be included in the death warrant—for example, the execution
period and the scheduled date and time of the execution.
Then, the procedures should determine the warrant period—how long
between the warrant being issued and the scheduled execution date. Likewise,
131

See Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 493 (Fla. 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (explaining
how warrant periods, since executions resumed in Florida after Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.
Ct. 616 (2016), have been too short to allow the courts sufficient time to review
defendants’ claims); see also Kalmanson, supra note 49, 630-34 (discussing the effect of
delay in the warrant and execution process).
132
See Outcomes of Death Warrants in 2020, supra note 7.
133
See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 20, at 87; Levit, supra note 34, at 56 (expressing procedural
due process concerns when postconviction review is expedited).
134
OR. REV. STAT. § 138.686(3) (2020).
135
Id. § 138.686(4).
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the procedures should indicate that the defendant is entitled to one postwarrant, pre-execution postconviction motion (and appeal), which shall be
final before the execution process begins. Thus, the time period defined in
the procedures between the warrant and the scheduled execution should be
long enough to allow the judiciary to thoroughly and adequately review the
defendant’s warrant- and execution-related claims without unnecessary rush.
As to the execution, the procedures should require the State to provide
adequate notice to an inmate whose execution is pending if the State changes
its lethal injection. Finally, the procedures should provide for what should
occur if, for some reason (including delay caused by last-minute appeals), the
execution does not occur at the date and time stated in the warrant.136
The proposed language below includes all of these aspects:
Uniform Warrant- and Execution-Related Procedures.
(1)
The clerk of the [state’s highest court] shall
inform the Governor in writing certifying when a person
convicted and sentenced to death (“the Inmate”) has:
(a)
Completed direct appeal and initial
postconviction proceedings in state court and habeas corpus
proceedings and appeal therefrom in federal court, and the
Inmate does not have any pending litigation related to his
conviction or sentence; or
(b)
Allowed the time permitted for filing a habeas
corpus petition in federal court to expire.
(2)
Within 30 days after receiving the letter of
certification from the clerk of the [state’s highest court], the
[Governor or appropriate actor] shall issue a warrant for
execution if the executive clemency process has concluded
and no cases remain pending, directing the warden to execute
the Inmate’s sentence 180 days from the date of the warrant
(“the Warrant Period”), at a time designated in the warrant.
(a)
Within twenty-four hours of the Governor
issuing the warrant, the [appropriate state department] shall
provide the Inmate and/or the Inmate’s attorney of record a
copy of the execution protocol that the State intends to use for
the execution.
(b)
If the State’s execution protocol changes
during the Warrant Period, the updated protocol shall be
provided to the Inmate and/or the Inmate’s attorney
136

See Kalmanson, supra note 49, 630-34 (explaining how these indefinite execution delays
likely create an Eighth Amendment violation).
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immediately. If the State adopts a new protocol within fifteen
days of the execution, the execution shall be rescheduled to
allow sufficient time for the Inmate to review and, if
necessary, challenge the amended protocol.
(c)
Within the Warrant Period provided in
paragraph (2), the defendant shall be entitled to complete a
final postconviction proceeding in state court and, if
necessary, a habeas corpus proceeding in federal court
regarding any warrant- or execution-related claims. The State
shall not execute the Inmate until all pending cases related to
the sentence for which the State intends to execute the Inmate
are completed.
(3)
The State shall not execute the Inmate’s
sentence until the Governor issues a warrant, attaches it to the
copy of the record, and transmits it to the warden, directing
the warden to execute the sentence at a date and time
designated in the warrant.
(4)
If, for any reason, the Inmate’s sentence is not
executed within thirty minutes of the time designated in the
warrant, the execution shall be automatically and immediately
stayed for a period of at least three (3) days.
(a)
If the stay is a result of delay, the Governor
shall issue a new warrant rescheduling the execution,
providing the Inmate with at least twenty-four hours notice.
(b)
Notwithstanding the three-day period provided
in subparagraph (4), any court may provide for a longer stay
period. If a court issues an indefinite stay, the warrant shall
expire. When the stay is lifted, this process shall restart from
the beginning.
(5) If, for any reason, a court determines that a stay is
necessary, it shall enter a stay of reasonable time to resolve
the problem causing the stay.
First, paragraph (1) explains when the State may execute an inmate’s
sentence—after the inmate’s guaranteed appeals are complete. This paragraph
also requires certification by the judiciary that the inmate has reached this point,
providing a balance of power between the executive and judicial branches.
Further, paragraph (1)(a) requires that all litigation from the
defendant’s guaranteed appeals be complete before the warrant issues. This
would significantly change and improve the backlog of pending petitions
with which the Supreme Court is often faced on the night of execution.
Oftentimes, a defendant goes into execution with a petition for writ of
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certiorari pending at the Supreme Court from a prior appeal.137 Thus, the
Supreme Court is reviewing not just the warrant-related petition, but several
pending petitions with an execution looming. Paragraph (1)(a) would curb
this issue by requiring that all of the defendant’s pending litigation related to
the sentence and conviction be complete before the warrant is issued.
Paragraph (2) provides a concrete timeline for all actors involved in
the warrant process—defining when the warrant will be issued, the time for
litigating any post-warrant claims, and when the execution should be
scheduled. Paragraphs (2)(a) and (2)(b) serve to streamline litigation
regarding the execution protocol that will be used in the execution. By
requiring the state to provide the defense with the protocol that will be used
in the inmate’s execution, these provisions eliminate the need for litigation
regarding access to the protocol.
Further, paragraph (2)(c) guarantees each defendant the ability to
raise any post-warrant and execution-related claims once the warrant is
issued. Consistent with the way these claims are currently litigated, these
claims would be brought via a postconviction motion in state court and, if
necessary, a federal habeas proceeding.
Under the statute, the final warrant-related case would be litigated in
the 180-day warrant period, which provides state courts (and, ultimately, the
Supreme Court) more time than they are often provided to review these
claims. This longer time period should provide sufficient time for the trial
court to hold an evidentiary hearing and/or for the appellate court to hold an
oral argument, if necessary. If not, the procedures provide that the defendant
is entitled to “complete” litigation of the final warrant-related claim; this
provision should be read to include the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari.
Additionally, under paragraph (5), courts would have grounds to stay the
execution to complete review of the case. Therefore, the guarantee provided
in paragraph (2)(c) curbs the due process concerns that coincide with
shortened warrant periods and accelerated postconviction litigation, as
scholars have articulated.138 Finally, the last sentence in paragraph (2)(c)
makes clear that the execution shall not proceed if any litigation related to the
sentence remains pending.
Paragraph (3) provides a procedural checklist to ensure the execution
does not proceed unless specific procedures have been followed. Finally,
paragraph (4) removes the unknown from delayed and rescheduled
executions, which has become prevalent with short warrant periods.
137

See, e.g., Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 704 (Fla. 2017) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (arguing
for a stay of execution until a pending petition for a writ of certiorari is resolved).
138
See generally Fisher, supra note 20; Levit, supra note 34 (expressing procedural due
process concerns when postconviction review is expedited).
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Paragraph (4) indicates that the time of execution set in the warrant is
a concrete time and shall be honored, within thirty minutes. Similarly,
paragraphs (4)(a) and (4)(b) explain what should occur if an execution is
delayed past the time provided. This eliminates the current situation of
defendants waiting—minute-by-minute, often for hours on end—to find out
whether the scheduled execution will proceed, as in Bucklew’s case.139 And,
if an execution must be rescheduled, the procedures provide guidelines for
doing so—rectifying the current lack of guidance, as Bucklew and Price
illustrate.140 In sum, these proposed procedures take the guesswork out of
executions—for both the government and the inmate.
C. Courts to Enforce Such Procedures
Enacting procedures like those outlined above is just the first step.
States enacting procedures like those proposed above is insignificant if the
procedures are not enforced, as illustrated by Idaho and Florida. Thus, the
crucial second step to the solution proposed herein is for courts to enforce the
procedures, once enacted.
For example, if the State amends its execution protocol within fifteen
days of the scheduled execution, the court has the power under paragraph
(2)(b) to stay the execution to allow for proper review and litigation over the
new protocol, if necessary. Also, paragraph (4) gives the court the power to
automatically enter a stay if the State does not begin the execution within
thirty minutes of the scheduled execution time. Finally, paragraph (5)
provides courts with oversight of the warrant process to ensure the
defendants’ constitutional rights are protected, allowing courts to enter a stay
for any reason the court deems proper. While courts technically have this
ability now, the language in the proposed procedures expressly providing
such power may incline courts to exercise it when feeling rushed in reviewing
warrant- and execution-related claims.
D. Addressing Counterarguments
Some may argue that this approach is more defendant-adverse than
the procedural problem it seeks to rectify—forcing executions, shortening the
time between sentencing and execution, and, thereby, increasing the risk of
executing innocent defendants. As with most issues related to capital
sentencing, this issue presents a discord between interested actors that is
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See supra Part III.
Id.

Vol. 5:4]

Somewhere Between Death Row and Death Watch

31

difficult to reconcile. Each of the potential counterarguments to the solution
proposed above is addressed, in turn, below.
At the outset, it is important to reiterate that this Article does not
address or otherwise consider abolition as a potential solution but, rather,
addresses the current system, in which death is a viable punishment in
numerous states. Without addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty
itself, this Article aims to improve the protection of defendants’ rights in a
system that accepts capital punishment.
First, some may counter this solution because it forces executions.141
The short response is: yes, but that is what the current system demands, if it
functions effectively. As stated at the outset, the purpose of this Article is not
to abolish capital sentencing but, rather, to preserve capital defendants’
constitutional rights so long as we have capital sentencing in the United
States. Relatively speaking, executions are rare in our current system because
of the extreme delays and discretion in issuing death warrants.142 Defendants
spend an inordinate amount of time on death row awaiting execution; most
times, defendants will suffer a natural death before reaching execution.143
This solution would likely cause an increase in the number of executions, and
it would likely cause those executions to happen faster, by requiring states to
schedule an inmate’s execution once the inmate completes the guaranteed
appeals—as outlined in paragraph (1) of the statute.
As to the merits, by facilitating a thorough review of defendants’
warrant- and execution-related claims, this solution, at the least, guarantees
that each defendant’s constitutional claims are properly reviewed before the
execution. As a result, some defendants may properly avoid execution
because the courts will find that their warrant- or execution-related claims, as
guaranteed by the procedures, are meritorious.
As to timing, there are competing arguments. Some—most famously,
Justice Breyer—would argue that shortening the time-frame between
sentencing and execution serves to lessen the “cruel and unusual” nature of
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See, e.g., Florida’s Timely Justice Act to Speed Up Executions Becomes Law, INNOCENCE
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supra note 9, at 2 (finding only 16 percent of death row inmates have been executed
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number of executions carried out year-to-year).
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the death penalty as it currently exists in the United States.144 Indeed,
defendants often challenge their sentences and/or executions under the Eighth
Amendment, arguing that the time they have waited on death row between
sentencing and execution amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.145 Others
may argue that it is better for a defendant to spend years awaiting execution
and, instead, die naturally than to proceed sooner to execution.
As long as the death penalty exists and a defendant stands sentenced
to death, case law directs that the state and victims have an interest in
executions occurring.146 To that extent, this solution serves those interests
while maintaining defendants’ right to due process in litigating their final
claims. This shortened time period may incentivize courts to review
defendants’ guaranteed appeals even more closely by avoiding fatigue in
reviewing the same defendants’ numerous claims. Thus, shortening the delay
between sentencing and execution actually serves the goal of ensuring
constitutionality throughout the capital punishment process.
Notwithstanding, if a state found that the procedures unnecessarily
forced warrants and therefore executions, it could enact an amended version
of the procedures in which paragraph (2) provides:
After receiving the letter of certification from the clerk of the
[state’s highest court], the [Governor or appropriate actor] may
issue a warrant for execution if the executive clemency process
has concluded and no cases remain pending. When the warrant
is issued, it shall direct the warden to execute the Inmate’s
sentence 180 days from the date of the warrant (“the Warrant
Period”), at a time designated in the warrant.
This amended version would make the state’s issuing the warrant
permissive rather than mandatory but still provide the defendant the same
protections once the warrant is issued.
Next, some may argue that shortening the time between sentencing
and execution lessens the time for the appellate process to work—especially

144
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as it relates to claims of innocence.147 It often takes years for a wrongly
convicted defendant to prove his or her innocence as a result of technological
advances.148 The concern of executing wrongly convicted inmates is of
utmost importance.149 Despite even the staggering amount of exonerations
that have occurred since 1973, it is likely that they are “only the tip of the
iceberg,” as Michael L. Radelet explains.150 However, the systemic issue of
executing innocent persons and their innocence not being detected until
years, if not decades, later is not fixed or eliminated by leaving defendants on
death row for years awaiting execution, which could be scheduled at any time
without warning.
In summary, this solution provides defendants with more notice and
process in the post-warrant, pre-execution process, thereby reducing the
overall risk of constitutional violations in each execution.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is the courts’ responsibility to ensure the
constitutionality of capital punishment, which includes safeguarding
defendants’ rights throughout the appellate process.151 While the period of
time between the state issuing a warrant for an inmate’s execution and the
actual execution is one of the most significant in a capital defendant’s life, it
is one of the most overlooked insofar as protecting defendants’ rights. During
147
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that time, defendants often raise claims that could significantly affect the
constitutionality of their ultimate execution. For example, defendants raise
claims challenging the constitutionality of the state’s process for signing
warrants, claims challenging the state’s execution protocol, etc.
As this Article explained, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in
Bucklew v. Precythe and Price v. Dunn illustrate the procedural hardship
capital defendants face across the country in raising these warrant- and
execution-related claims. Through decades of jurisprudence, courts have
effectively precluded defendants from meaningfully raising these claims. The
correct time for defendants to raise warrant- and execution-related claims is
some mysterious point between death row and death watch. While raising a
claim before the defendant is under an active death warrant is too early,
raising a claim while under a death warrant just before execution is too late.
These claims fall into a black hole of procedural technicalities, likely
subjecting defendants to unconstitutional executions.
In addition, ever-shortening warrant periods force courts to review the
claims defendants do raise in last-minute fire drills. This often forces the
Supreme Court to review several last-minute petitions for certiorari, the
denial of which is the last step before the defendant’s execution. This lastminute rush has recently resulted in executions being delayed late into the
night, which presents additional constitutional concerns.
Addressing this problem, this Article explained that the best way to
manage all the competing interests involved in this discussion is for state
legislatures to enact and courts to enforce uniform warrant procedures. In
defining this solution, this Article proposed model language for states to
adopt—whether as statute or rules—procedures that outline the warrant
process and, without compromising the state’s interest in the timely execution
of death sentences, safeguard defendants’ rights up until execution. For as long
as the death penalty remains viable in the United States, states should act
diligently to respect and protect each defendant’s rights until the time of death.

